Compare
Branchscope, GitHub and GitLab
Team plans side by side: what they cost, how many CI minutes come with them, where your code lives, and how changes are reviewed.
| Feature | Branchscope Developer | GitHub Team | GitLab Premium |
|---|---|---|---|
| Price | |||
| Price per user a month | €20 | $4 | $29 |
| Hosted CI minutes a month | 2,000 per userat least 10,000 per organizationPlanned | 3,000 per organization | 10,000 per organization |
| Extra minutes (2 vCPU Linux) | €0.005Planned | $0.006 | $0.01 |
| Where your code lives | |||
| Hosted in the EU | On every plan | Enterprise only | GitLab Dedicated only |
| Run it yourself | Docker Compose, on every plan | GitHub Enterprise Server | Self-managed |
| Signing in | |||
| Single sign-on with your company's identity provider (SAML or OIDC) | On the Team planPlanned | Enterprise Cloud only | Included |
| Reviewing changes | |||
| Reviews as diagrams derived from the code | |||
Prices as published on October 20, 2026, before tax. GitHub's and GitLab's minutes are shared by the whole organization.
Side by side
What changes when agents write the code
The same situations on GitHub and on Branchscope: reviewing a change, an agent's access, a break in another repository, and a branch that has moved on.
- which parts of the system it touches
- whether the UI now talks to the database directly
- that the web app still calls the DELETE it removed
AI review comments, where used, are generated text: a re-run can say something different.
- same commit, same diagrams, byte for byte
- rule and plan checks down to the file and line
- reported as the check branchscope/review, which a ruleset can require before a merge
The token decides, not who holds it. Restricting an agent means building it yourself: narrower tokens, rules that name it, reviews you remember to ask for.
Secrets are withheld from forks' pull requests, and an environment can require a reviewer. But a branch pushed with the token is trusted like any other: a workflow edited on it, with a token allowed to change workflows, can read the repository's secrets.
Every push and merge goes through the push guard, which knows who and which agent is acting. Protected branches and tags refuse agents by default.
A run an agent set off gets no secrets or identity token until a person approves it; agents only draft releases and can never approve a deployment. People merge.
The review sees billing-api's diff. Nothing there says who calls it: the break shows up later, when web-app and mobile-bff fail in production or in their own CI.
Dependency graphs list packages, not which endpoints, messages or tables one service uses of another.
Breaking: stops serving DELETE /invoices/{}, which web-app and mobile-bff still call (with links to each call).
Joined from every repository's graph by endpoint, channel and table; compared with the default branch, or with what's deployed to production. Repositories you can't read stay invisible. The organization's Graph tab draws it all.
Only where the same lines were edited. And it misses what merges cleanly as text but is still broken:
Both sides since the merge base, element by element, with code links on each side. Selecting one highlights it in both.
Semantic conflict: main removes formatInvoice(), which the change starts calling. Merges cleanly as text.
Shown as a warning in the merge box, from the same graphs as the review, before anything is merged.
Agents can draft releases, open changes, comment, and post status updates on a change.
- Activity names the agent and who it acted for on every push, merge and refusal: "claude for alice"
- The audit log records who changed settings; webhooks and integrations carry the agent too
- Rulesets can bypass a person without bypassing their agent; an agent app can have its own bypass
- Teams can hand an installed agent app their AI provider key, with a monthly spend cap Branchscope enforces
GitHub as it works out of the box, with branch protection or rulesets on main and Actions for CI.
On every Branchscope plan
What security and procurement teams ask about, and what checking agents' work needs.
Fails closed
Every push and merge passes the push guard. If it can't be reached, nothing lands.
No outside calls you didn't set up
Branchscope calls other services only when you set it up. An import you start reads that repository from GitHub or GitLab once. Administrators can add mirrors, which push branches and tags on to another git host; webhooks, which send events to the URLs they give or to apps they install; and integrations, which post to Slack, Discord, Microsoft Teams, Mattermost or Sentry. All are off until added, and the keys, tokens and chat URLs they use are stored encrypted.
No trackers
The web app loads no third-party scripts, analytics or trackers, and serves its own fonts. Your browser talks only to Branchscope.
No AI on your code
Code graphs and reviews are derived by compilers and extractors, never by an AI model, and Branchscope sends your code to none.
Identity you control
People sign in through Keycloak over OIDC. Disable someone there and their sessions, tokens and SSH keys stop working within a minute or two.
Every action attributed
Each push, merge and refusal records who did it and, for agents, which agent acted for whom. The audit log records who changed security settings, such as rulesets, secrets, mirrors and access, and when.